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You bring up an interesting point. Is there some sort of EMC (Electromagnetic Compatibility) standard for automobiles, similar to Mil-Std-461 for military gear?
There is one thing about noise trouble shooting: no cases are the same and satisfying low probability failure rates is extremely difficult. It is statistical problem where one has to accelerate the failures by stress testing so cause and effect improvements can be made
Exactly. Consider how many Toyota are out there, being driven day in and day out with no SUA incidents at all. What's that, hundreds of millions or billions of throttle operations in a year, yet only a handful of SUA incidents. That's a lot better than 6 nine's reliability.
I think that with nothing known about the throttle circuitry it is hard to favor anything because the options are infinite. But since I had 6 identical incidents in a different environment each time I would have to guess that in my case the trigger was internal to my car. In trouble shooting such a low probability event it has been my experience that you have to make a list of various causes and try and define a stress test to see if you could invoke the problem for each item on the list. It could be triggered by voltage noise due to some unknown condition, a ground loop resonance, as mentioned before software glitches --- noise doesn't have to be only voltage.
And your right the SUA incident would be very difficult to replicate because you would be working your way through a long list of suspects hoping you could stress the electronic throttle system in a way that would show the problem. You might be wrong on a list of 100 suspects and find it is the 100th idea tested.
I cut my teeth on the magnetic drum system on the Univac 1107 in the 60's. The system would run intermittently and then quite. A sudden rush of cold air on my neck when the air conditioner turned on that coincided with the failure gave the idea that it might be temperature related. Running a hair dryer on the drum intake showed that the clock pulse interrogating data would move over 4 data pulses with the hot air and move back when it cooled. An overnite fix with a drum temperature control solved the problem. It took about 6 months to nail. At the time we were running 7/24 with management covering shifts trying to push out the 20 first computers systems on the floor that weren't running because the drum didn't work. Tremendous pressure to say the least ---- but the most fun in trying to figure it all out.
For this problem one would have to have a lot of information for the Toyota electronic throttle which I would question the feasibility of getting. Does anyone know if it is possible to get this type of information?
I've read a lot of the posts and there are a lot of good ideas out there
http://www.autoblog.com/2010/03/08/report-abc-news-faked-at-least-one-part-of-ru- naway-toyota-repor/?icid=main|htmlws-main-n|dl9|link5|http%3A%2F%2Fwww.autoblog.- com%2F2010%2F03%2F08%2Freport-abc-news-faked-at-least-one-part-of-runaway-toyota- -repor%2F
Extrapolating on that is your idea because these sensitive electronic systems in Toyota's vehicles are like mini-antenna systems giving all that cellphone energy a place to call home. Look a second please at how many of these incidents are happening as the vehicle is in motion traveling horizontal to the cellphone energy, meaning their electronics systems are in effect cutting across artificially-created gravitational lines of flux.
Cellphone radiation may affect humans less since we don't walk 60 miles per hour everywhere we go. Right now we are still using Internet Protocol #4 (IPv4) but there are worldwide communications companies pressing hard to get people to accept Free or Low Cost international communications and phones which extra usage would then force IPv6 to be needed.
Why? => Because they are pushing the limits of IPv4 to force the world community to turn the dial up to Internet Protocol #6 (IPv6). IPv6 may very well cause more Toyota crashes from runaways. I heard a report this morning the same thing happened to a guy driving a Prius so this is no longer Toyota's problem alone. ** The wonderful Toyota Corporation cannot be held responsible for the communications industry hot-wiring the earth's atmosphere stuffed full of stray EMF radiation. **
My submission for the Toyota unintended acceleration problem by huanito
Mar 08, 2010 (1:53 pm)
March 8, 2010, at 1:30 pm, a Prius accelerated ...
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100309/us_nm/us_toyota_california_5
huanito said toyota good, the news said toyota no good.
CORRUPTED SOFTWARE OR MALICIOUS CODE INJECTED
The firmware has either become corrupted or contains a malicious code.
When the various sensor inputs present to the computer their signals in a particular order and value, the software generates a full-throttle command.
Causes:
1. This could be a result of an intentional or unintentional error in the computer's code as it was written but unlikely as Toyota has repeatedly tested their software.
2. This may also be caused by the firmware having become corrupted by any number of sources.
3. A malicious code has been unintentionally loaded into the computer's memory after the vehicle has left he factory. There are several possibilities for this scenario:
a. Routine service of the vehicle by an authorized dealer. When the technician connects his/her OBD test equipment to the vehicle's port, the vehicle's software is unknowingly re-written.
b. Annual inspections also require a technician to read the vehicles codes via the OBD port. Again, a malicious code could be written to the vehicle's computer.
The equipment used to read the vehicle's OBD port has changes or upgrades loaded onto it on a regular basis. The source of the malicious code:
a. Updates downloaded from the Toyota website
b. Updates sent by Toyota via CD-ROM
c. The manufacturer of the equipment's website
d. Updates sent by the manufacturer of the equipment via CD-ROM
Any of these update sources could had been hacked.
1) Satellite Radio/GPS for intended or unintended computer intrusion into drive by wire
2) for Cell or PDA interference with drive by wire functions
One thing that I think needs to be corrected after the claims in this latest news story, and others is, the term "unintended acceleration." I don't believe it is any longer the proper term to match the claims being made. If my vehicle accelerates "unintendedly" that term connotates an inconvenient situation that I can stop or control to some degree at any point if I wish too. I think the proper term to match the claims that are being made is "uncontrollable acceleration." But, if the descriptive term is upgraded to the adjective uncontrollable, then that raises the question as to why, with all these uncontrollable acceleration incidents, has there been no collisions, injuries, or even worse, fatalities.
If multiple vehicles, the number of which has been described in the claims, begin accelerating uncontrollably, it is a matter of simple odds, with the heavy road traffic, non-linear roads, and multiple stop signs and red lights, that the above consequences would result. Yet, none seemed to have happened so far. Of course, odds do allow for the possibility that a car could go careening down the road uncontrollably without colliding with something, or injuring or killing someone, but I believe astronomical would be the term to best describe them.
Again, I am not saying an uncontrollable acceleration problem absolutely does not exist in Toyota vehicles. But, there could be many reasons that a Toyota owner or driver, could or would make a claim like this. I'll let your imagination decide what those reasons could be. For myself, I am saying that many things about this situation simply do not add up, and I offered a possible theory as to what could be behind this issue. But ultimately, I will reserve my final judgement for when all the pieces of this puzzle fall into place, as I'm sure we will all be compelled to do.
The fix according to me would be to modify the firmware such that when the car speed is less than the speed which automatically engages the front seat seatbelt 'unattached' alarm, the switched voltage to the radiator fan can be half-split in order to drive the fan at half-speed and therefore draw a fraction of the current from the electrical system. This should relieve the alternator from signaling the engine rpm to compensate with a sudden rpm increase and also provide the engine with the necessary cooling while at idle speed.
I would be happy if Toyota could do that for me.
I am interested in Toyota problems about unintended acceleration of Toyota vehicles and have red many articles about the problems on www.toyota.com, www.edmuns.com and other relevant websites. I decide to make a proposal to solve the problems for TOYOTA as follows:
In my mind, root cause of all incidents of Toyota vehicles relevant with unintended acceleration problem is not in gas pedal but in electronic equipment of the throttle explored in high humidity condition. I did see any ECM in fact but see on the picture and believe this ECM is not too water proof in place of I/O outlet!!!
As I see on this picture, I/O of this ECM are likely to Ethernet cable outlets that their pins are too close to each other. In high humidity condition vapor can enter clearance between cable plug and outlets. When ambient temperature of the ECM reduce due weather or even due running conditioner of car, small drops of water may appear and connect pins and short circuit will occur that situation as professor’s Gilbert experiment will occur in real world! Because water is reason of unintended acceleration what will be evaporated quickly that very difficultly to recreate the situation in after incident investigations.
To avoid this problem some follow measures will be done:
1. Make ECM more waterproof, especially where I/O of ECM and gas pedal.
2. A simple and safest method to come out from unintended acceleration situation is that Toyota can supply a switch to switch of voltage (< 5VDC) from ECM to throttle’s step motor when press on brake pedal and engine immediately come to idle condition. This method can make vehicle safe when wrong press both gas and brake pedals at same time too.
More explanation: As I have noted above that water is main culprit of suddenly unintended acceleration of cars with electronic throttle. But where water from?
Body of ECM is made with stainless steel to protect ECM from RF. If ECM is not dressed with plastic cover when ambient temperature reduced by air conditioner humidity in air can create water drops on surface of ECM, these drops of water may join each other to create small flows and can enter outlets of ECM.
That happens to my favorite theory also. While the software in the ECU was tested, thoroughly, I'm sure, it is almost impossible, except by using formal methods, to guarantee that the SW is bug free.
Here you have a piece of code that takes inputs from dozens or more sensors (including the throttle position sensor), processes those inputs, and uses the results to control fuel injector and spark timing, evaluate whether emissions are being met or not, and also, positions the throttle. It is impossible to test for all possible combination of inputs, over all ranges of values (both in range and out of range), over all possible input sequences, over all environmental conditions, ... (well, you get my drift). So, while the SW may very have been extensively tested, I'm sure many people could come up with a scenario that was not tested.
No amount of testing is going to guarantee that the SW is bug free. That merely reduces the probability that one or more bugs exist. So, given millions of vehicles driven thousands of miles a year, it should not surprise any of us that certain combination of inputs/values/sequences/timing, etc that may cause the UA problem will occur.
If this is not the problem then the runaway accelerator could be forced to disconnect using the vehicles speed sensor to tell when the vehicle is moving and a momentary switch to turn off the throttle to prevent a runaway situation.
Barring this, going back to a cable controlled throttle would more than likely prevent the problem.
Very well-reasoned and well-presented.
(And I'm not just saying that because I'm hoping you will give me part of your pending $1M prize!)
For those who surmise that EMI from 30KV power lines could be the cause - I have big doubts about that idea.
We could possibly consider to do the math using 1/R^2 law, google/pick some reasonable numbers for current flow, and compare EMI/flux from 30KV power lines 200 feet from the ECM, and ignition spark/current just a few inches from the ECM.
Then just for comparison, compare the flux from a 12V/low-current electric razor when at a distance of a few millimeters. May as well throw in a comparison of cellphone EMI flux too... Also we might want to consider that the ECM is presumably inside a faraday-cage and thus immune to RFI/EMI. The sensors feeding the ECM can't all be inside faraday cages, can they? maybe they could be affected.
One reason I like Nguyen's water idea is that it appears to be one of the simplest explanations that can explain the behavior. Bugs almost always seem mysterious before the root-cause is found. After they are discovered and the engineers say, "wow that seems so obvious in hindsight - how did we ever miss that?!"
A possible way to test the humidity-theory against current data is to correlate the humidity level for the time/location of each accident. Another approach could be to look for regional variations in the UA reports - are they happening mostly in humid areas of USA? (
a bientot...
I agree with this 100%. Last week we bought a Kia Soul and while checking under the hood I noticed it still has the traditional cable going to the throttle body from the gas pedal. I became used to driving cars with the drive-by-wire system, a Honda Accord and a VW GTI, and I was really pleased with the Kia's acceleration from a full stop, it is much smoother (not faster, smoother) than cars with the electronic throttle. I'm sure it costs less as well.
It is also possible that a layout mistake creates a parasitic MOS device that has the same effect. To analyze this I would need the schematic, device layout, and semiconductor process parameters. Unfortunately, I can see no way to get this information unless Toyota cooperates.
If you would like to proceed, my e-mail is williamtduffy@gmail.com
After reference of evaluation of Gilbirt demonstration by the Exponent I have finding that disign of the socket on gas pedal is not so good:
• Orientation of the socket for plug in from top on the gas pedal is good path for water entering in case of damage of gasket.
• Plastic shell surrounds housing of male portion to prevent direct moisture contact: but the plastic as a cup for keeping water inside the socket.
• Wire are individually sealed with cylindrical polymeric grommets: water follows wires can fill up the grommets and under vibration generated by running engine and running car step by step may enter the socket through the poor elastic grommets and accumulated inside.
Due these wicknesses water may enter into socket and cause short circuit between wires.
The best design for this socket is it's orientation to be rotated down!
If that happened, wouldn't the IC likely fail permanently because of high current? And, even if it didn't fail catastrophically, wouldn't there be some indication of this condition that would show up during a failure analysis - either a visual inspection or SEM?
And you're right - Toyota or it's IC vendor is not going to willingly give up the information you mention. IP rights, trade secrets, and aall that sort of stuff. However, there are companies out there that could reverse engineer such a chip,
They would likely be threatened with the DMCA by Toyota if they tried that tactic to fix this problem!
Probably right. What a POS piece of legislation that is. Topic for another thread...
Though, I wonder if that statute would apply to a defective product???
I was also figuring that maybe the feds would reverse engineer, or have a company they hire do it. That would leave the private company off the hook for any kind of IP violation. Then, let Toyota go after the feds.
It depends. If the current had more than one path to ground, it might burn out the metal links on the chip. But it is possible that the stepper motor has a high enough impedance to limit the current and preserve the chip. And indeed, if the chip burned out, an inspection would reveal the fault.
Vehicles most probably to exhibit a glitch: Toyota Camry SE or XLE with 3.5 V6 engine and smart key, and Lexus ES 350.
Test 1 for software glitch: Cruise Control ON and engaged at set speed of 60 MPH or greater. Use the accelerator pedal to accelerate the vehicle speed to 15 MPH greater than the set speed. Test 2 for a software glitch Engine Coolant temperature is at or below 50º C, Cruise Control ON. Note engine idle RPM. place vehicle in Drive and accelerate to 1200 RPM above the noted engine idle RPM.
It is of interest that if the current data recording devises installed in the vehicles in question have not been interrogated as to the operation of the vehicle during the crash event.
If one goes back a few years, Mitsubishi had a similar problem in Japan, where they were (hiding) a lot of issues with their cars. Finally it came out. Embarrassment is a cultural problem in japan, where one does not easily admit to their faults. Mitsubishi was slammed hard by the consumer and suffered years of poor sales. Not sure if they ever recovered.
Toyota seems to be going in the same direction. Everything seems to point to electronics, if its firmware or cruise control related, it does not seem to be hardware related.
Anyway, it's time the Japanese culture admits making errors is actually a good thing....
That said, my approach would be as follows: put a vehicle that has exhibited the acceleration problem on a dynamometer, run the car at about 40 mph. Radiate the car in accordance with RS101 and RS103, of MIL-STD-461 (REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONTROL OF ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBSYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT). The military tests are more stringent than national/commercial tests (EN/TUV/CISPR, etc.).
RS101and RS103 are used to emulate RF magnetic and electric fields and their effects on electronics to be installed on military tanks, ships, planes, etc. They emulate emissions from car electronic components, game boys, security devices (driving past banks), etc. in asystematic way. Monitor the car for acceleration/reaction. If there are no reactions to the radiated fields (30Hz-40GHZ), then it is unlikely this is an EMC problem, and is mostly mechanical in nature (something jammed).
There are laboratories across the nation that do this type of testing. A list is available here: http://ts.nist.gov/Standards/scopes/ect.htm
Once these tests are completed, hand held antennas can be used to determine which component is susceptible. Then the coupling method will need to be defined, and a resolution determined. This type of testing could cost $20,000 - $50,000, but provides the data needed to define the problem.
I've done this method with dozens of problems, and always defined the problem. If a chip is the culprit, it need not be redesigned. Good Shielding Practices can easily resolve the problem.
"A majority of motorcycles still use carburetors due to lower cost and throttle response problems with early injection setups, but as of 2005 many new models are now being introduced with fuel injection. Carburetors are still found in small engines and in older or specialized automobiles, such as those designed for stock car racing."
And then there's this: "EFI could cause big problems. The sophisticated microprocessors used with EFI systems can do more than just meter fuel. The technology already exists to drive the car by itself.". Read it yourself "here".
Just wondering if there's more problems up ahead, than the issues known to us today...
Step 1 - Did all of the cars have cruise control.
If not, what did all of the cars have in common?
Just my 2 bits.
Mike G
Is there an automotive equivalent to Mil-Std-461? Something put out by SAE, perhaps?
I am sure this is in cars today, but not offered as a service. They would have been doing testing.
Has anyone looked into the idea that hackers may get into this system to effect individual cars.
I know this is a bit "out there" but technically, it could be possible.
Bankrupt and a Car Guy [Corvettes]
I hope CHIP and Toyota Criminally Charge him when it's proven he faked the whole event. That will Cut Down on Unintended Acceleration Events.