Did you have valve lifter problems? They had difficulty getting the upper engine to oil properly that year. How about your electric torsion bars? Ever get stuck up in the air?
Who made the transmissions for Packard? Dd they buy GM units? I saw a 1956 Packard Patrician sedan for sale-the guy regularly drove it to Florida and back-he claimed he no problesm keeping up with traffic.
Can anyone help me determine the displacement of my '55 Patrician. My mechanic is in a quandry. Number on top of block is 5582 2939. We are told it's a 322, 352 or 374.... Help!!
The overhang is the long-hood short-deck theory, which Studebaker pretty much pioneered with their Hawk series in '56 and everyone else started doing around the '65 model year. Look at a '64 Pontiac anything...it has a short-hood and long deck!
There is a story behind the upright windshield. I heard Otis Romine, a Studebaker truck engineer who pitched in on the Avanti, say at a seminar about 15 years ago, that Studebaker's president, Sherwood Egbert, a 40-something 6'4" ex-Marine, kept knocking his head on the Avanti seating buck every time he came into the engineering studio and insisted on increased headroom...hence the upright windshield.
Bill P.
2024 Chevrolet Corvette Stingray 2LT; 2019 Chevrolet Equinox LT; 2015 Chevrolet Cruze LS
I had heard that Nance, in a fit, had stuff destroyed (he was, after all, President of Studebaker-Packard and was a Packard guy), but thousands of Packard documents, post-merger and pre-merger, including blueprints, made their way into the Studebaker National Museum archives.
Bill's post #113 above was moved from another topic and relates to an on-going discussion of the demise of Packard when it was taken over by Studebaker.
Packard bought Studebaker...you do know that, right? When it came down to what had to be done to survive.....the board/shareholders/Curtiss Wright decided Packard had to go as they were the bigger loser by '56. Packard's sales took a 67% dive from 1955 (Studebaker's only a little better, a 33% dive from '55--source, Business Week, April 21, 1956).
There is no question that Packard had much more cash in bank at the time of the merger. Would they themselves have survived the serious production and sales decline issues of '55-56, or the change in the marketplace in '57-58 as cars in that market found less favor (like Edsel and Mercury sales then)? No one will know I guess. But Studebaker survived them and lasted a decade longer than Hudson (AMC was really mostly 'Nash' after the merger), Kaiser-Frazer, Willys automobiles, etc.
S-P losses during the merger years: 1955 $29.7 million (Source: Business Week, April 21, 1956) 1956 $43 million (Sources: too many to enumerate) 1957 $11 million (Sources: too many to enumerate--75% reduction of loss with reduced sales from '56--Packard gone) 1958 $13 million 1959 $28.5 million profit
Studebaker built automobiles until March 17, 1966--ten years after the last Packard was built. This is a 'quick demise'? And the Canada plant was making a small profit on their production when they shut down. Problem was, the other divisions were doing much better and the Board wasn't happy with a small profit.
In fact, Studebaker Corp. stayed in business, just didn't build cars. The Parts and Service Division remained in business in South Bend until 1972, and in fact had contracts with dealers around the country and in Canada to be 'authorized Studebaker parts and service dealers' until that time, if the dealer wished to do so (our small town Chrysler-Plymouth-AMC dealer picked up the official franchise in Jan. '69 after our longtime Stude dealer got out of the business). There are pictures I could post of the factory Studebaker Parts Depot in South Bend taken in 1971!
And if you saw the file cabinet upon file cabinet of Packard stuff in the archives at the Studebaker National Museum, including build sheets for '55 and '56 models, I think you wouldn't be able to make the blanket statement, "Studebaker destroyed all of Packard's records".
And come on, 180 hp 4-barrel with automatic, power steering and brakes, Twin Traction, 2-door hardtop '59 Lark could have been built in 1935? We all know what they say about opinions, everybody has one, but staying somewhat factual can help too!
Bill P.
2024 Chevrolet Corvette Stingray 2LT; 2019 Chevrolet Equinox LT; 2015 Chevrolet Cruze LS
No, didn't say that. I said that Studebaker threw thousands of Packard archives into the dumpster. Whether some outraged historian rescued them or not is beside the point, right?
Studebaker market share in 1963 was .9%...that's right, Point Nine of one percent.
The company was a walking corpse even in 1954 when the S-P merger occurred. They were losing money faster than Packard, and in the merger, Nance allowed Studebaker to control the board of the new company.
Nance even tried to sell S-P immediately to Ford, and considered liquidating the company in 1955.
Packard stockholders were the most enraged, as thousands of them wrote to Nance before the merger to warn him that this was the worst possible idea.
Turns out, Packard stockholders were more educated than most, and they were right. Studebaker was sicker than Packard, it turns out.
Packard should have just died a dignified death instead of allowing itself to be looted and trashed IMO.
Studebaker was barbaric. The way they got rid of many of the longterm Packard people was to give them offices and jobs in Siberia, with nothing to do. They just humiliated them enough so that they'd quit. One man I know who worked for Packard for 25 years got about a $46 a month pension from Studebaker.
My opinion was that Studebaker executives actually committed fraud in this deal. They doctored and hide the true financial status of their company--a company I might add that was threatened with bankruptcy even before the merger, as later investigation showed.
I think "The Fall of the Packard Motor Company" by James Ward pretty much spells out the whole ugly story.
Yes, Everything in your above post, I have indeed read before and believe as accurate--including the .9% market share in '63. I'm able to admit that. Some Studebaker employees got no pension after the Dec. '63 South Bend shutdown. In fact, the ERISA laws about pensions did come about as a result of the South Bend shutdown.
Studebaker built about 80,000 1963-model Lark, Cruiser, Hawk, and Avanti cars. Trucks in total I'm not sure, but I know 5,800 pickups on top of that. Packard built 28,000 1956-model Packards and Clippers. What would their market share have been in '56? Even sicker than .9%. Packard built 200 cars in Feb. '56 (per Ward's book).
The Studebaker National Museum archives consists almost entirely of the records of the Studebaker Corporation as given to the City of South Bend after auto production ceased. They don't have tons of Packard records because 'some historian pulled them out of the dumpster' in Detroit. Sheesh.
You like Packard better than Studebaker, and me, the other way around. I don't think either of us will ever convince the other, otherwise! And that's OK of course. I just felt that initially, your posts (admittedly, your opinions) pretty much towed the typical Packard-buff line and in some places were factually questionable by means of omission of some significant other things going on at the same time, which deserved to be mentioned in context and are widely verifiable in Studebaker circles.
Bill P.
2024 Chevrolet Corvette Stingray 2LT; 2019 Chevrolet Equinox LT; 2015 Chevrolet Cruze LS
Well somebody rescued some Packard archives because we do have some of them. I'm not surprised then that it wasn't anyone related to Studebaker :P But enormous amounts were lost unfortunately.
It's really not about "liking" one company or another. It's about trying to look at what really might have happened. I have no horse in this race, really.
From all I've read, I see a lot of treachery here, from Nance, from Studebaker, and from regulators turning a blind eye to various violations.
Perhaps it's just all the human failings that come about from desperation.
I guess my only prejudice might be that I would have rather seen Packard survive than Studebaker. I think it was a much more interesting car in 55-56, I mean technically. Studebaker products were antiquated, as befits a capital-starved company.
Mr. (Obama/McCain, your choice!), I've enjoyed the debate!
I don't mean to say that Studebaker's hiding of their true financial shape, by omission in '54, or Packard's not researching it further prior to the purchase, is not a bad thing. It is, of course. But I think the sales situation in the merger years.....the public's opinion of the company's products in the marketplace....was a result of something else entirely, by spring of 1956. I think Packard's quality image was largely gone by that time, due to word-of-mouth on the '55's and early '56's. Really, the bottom just fell out of their sales in '56...worse than Studebaker's. And the fact is, a '56 Packard Four-Hundred, to my eyes, in Scottish Heather and White, is the most desirable Packard I'd consider owning (despite my total lack of mechanical ability!).
Like today... I doubt news of GM's financial situation really keeps anybody from buying a GM product if they want one. But if they hear their neighbor's new GM blah-blah-blah is a quality disaster, that will keep them from buying. I think that has to be brought into the S-P mid-'50's discussion, at some point, as well as Studebaker's mis-stated break-even numbers two years before the combined company crumbled. One must also consider Studebaker's post-Packard sales successes (Scotsman, Lark, even Gran Turismo Hawk to a lesser extent) in context with the failed 'merger'.
I've enjoyed the debate...onto the next item!
Bill P.
2024 Chevrolet Corvette Stingray 2LT; 2019 Chevrolet Equinox LT; 2015 Chevrolet Cruze LS
Packard was by nature a conservative company and this probably kept it alive as long as it did. The pre-war (pre 41) styling was "ahead of its time but not TOO far ahead" and Packard pulled off this hat trick time and time again.
Many well-trained men came out of Packard to find glory (and infamy) in careers with other automakers.
In the 20s and 30s, the three Ps (Packard, Peerless and Pierce Arrow) could proudly stand parked next to any Rolls Royce or fancy Italian coachwork.
but I can't remember. I know it was actually Packard that bought out Studebaker, but could someone explain to me why it was the Packard platform that was dumped after 1956, and the nameplate itself after 1958?
Something else I always wondered...there was talk one time of a merger with Nash/Hudson, in the hopes of creating a "Big Four" and going head to head with GM, Ford, and Chrysler in all price categories. Now in something like that, I could definitely see Packard being the top run, along the lines of a Buick or Chrysler, although I really wouldn't see them as being able to pull off a Cadillac level of prestige. And I always looked at a Hudson as being a bit upscale. But which would have been the bottom feeder...Studebaker or Nash?
AFter ther merger, Packard discovered to its horror that STudebaker had disguised its financial situation; after a miserable sales year in '56, S-P brokered a management deal with Curtiss-Wright, and I think it was Curtiss-Wright who essentially demanded the termination of Packard. Not sure but that's how I remember it.
As for the merger into a "Big Four", once Mason of Nash-Kelvinator died, the new president Romney was not interested in a merger of the 4 companies.
This is also why a Nash Metropolitan looks like it has refrigerator doors :P
A couple other quotes from the April 21, 1956 issue of Business Week:
"The Packard-Clipper end of the business has been the heaviest loser. According to one report, Packard has already been offered to Ford Motor Co. and turned down. Packard-Clipper Div. just announced a $3 million promotion campaign, biggest in its history".
"One proposal that Wall Street hears is under study is to sell the Packard engine plant at Utica, Mich., to a truck manufacturer, move Packard assembly to a smaller plant, and put the huge Detroit plant up for sale. Headquarters would be moved to South Bend, Ind., Studebaker's home, and the Studebaker nucleus itself might be sold to some company that could use a tax loss."
I can't remember where...maybe it was the '56 Annual Report, maybe not...but I remember reading that sale of the big East Grand Boulevard Packard plant brought in only $750,000. By the '55 model year, production already had moved out of there and into a small former Chrysler plant on Conner Blvd.
Bill P.
2024 Chevrolet Corvette Stingray 2LT; 2019 Chevrolet Equinox LT; 2015 Chevrolet Cruze LS
I agree with your "Three P's " assessment. But don't forget about the Studebaker Presidents of the early '30's, cars recognized as "Classics" by the Classic Car Club of America. Richard Langworth states in his introduction to "The Illustrated Studebaker Buyer's Guide", quote,
"The Studebaker President was one of the most glorious cars of the Golden Age and set countless records on road and track. It was also beautifully styled, impeccably engineered, and a better road car than such highly respected "Classics" (as defined by the CCCA) as Packard, Cadillac, and Pierce Arrow--and I have this on the authority of people who have owned all four".
Bill P.
2024 Chevrolet Corvette Stingray 2LT; 2019 Chevrolet Equinox LT; 2015 Chevrolet Cruze LS
It's fun to rewrite history but as Richard himself implies, the car at no time had the respect and prestige of the Three Ps.
Nice car, though, very nice and a few models bring serious money today, but without V-12s and V-16s, it's really not in the same class as a Packard, Cadillac or Pierce. Hollywood stars and European heads of state and Saudi princes did not rush out to buy Studebakers but they did buy Packards.
They are more in the Buick class IMO, or perhaps LaSalle.
"...I always looked at a Hudson as being a bit upscale. But which would have been the bottom feeder...Studebaker or Nash?"
I think there was too much overlap between Hudson, Nash, and Studebaker to create a viable competitor against the Big Three. If Hudson, Nash, Packard and Studebaker had combined into one company, Packard could have gone against Cadillac, Lincoln, and Imperial by dropping the medium price models. It would have been more challenging to sort out how to position Hudson, Nash and Studebaker. Even though many of their models competed price-wise, they were very different cars, with different philosophies. They really didn't complement each other, which is important for a successful merger. That may be why the merger never happened.
If Willys had been added to the merger mix, that brand could have been the bottom feeder.
I think if you look at production figures, product lines, styling, technology, etc., it would become somewhat apparent in MY crystal ball at least that GM and Ford would have rolled right over #4 of the Big Four. I mean, Chrysler *barely* survived in the next decade, and they were pumping out Hemis, fins, doing big splashes on TV, breaking records and saying up to snuff technically (the first alternator, torsion bar suspension, etc) in the late 50s, early 60s.
GM's stuff was so sexy, so modern---they were just whumping the competition and slapping Ford and Chrysler silly in terms of market share.
The truth is probably more frightening - Studebaker's leaders had no idea of how sick their company really was.
After the merger, Packard's controller visited South Bend and was horrified to discover that Studebaker's break-even point was well over 300,000 vehicles! The company had only hit that figure once before (1950). When he confronted Studebaker's top management with this information, they dismissed it, noting that the company had made money on lower volume in other years.
What Studebaker management missed is that, one, during the early 1950s, their labor costs had drifted far out of line with the Big 3; two, their factory was increasingly antiquated and less productive than competitors' facilities; and three, beginning with the Ford Blitz of 1953, discounts by ALL car companies were necessary to move the metal.
Studebaker had made money on lower volume during the postwar sellers' market, when demand outstripped supply, and it could charge more for its vehicles and maintain volume. Once the postwar sellers' market ended, factors one and two reared their ugly heads with a vengeance. Studebaker also didn't take into account that a fair percentage of its total profit was coming from defense work.
A Studebaker staffer "costed out" a 1953 Commander Starliner using GM's cost structure. He discovered that GM could have sold it for LESS than the cost of a Chevrolet. Studebaker had to sell it at Buick prices, and was still not making any money!
The entire merger had been conducted on a "friendly" basis. Neither side spent much time examining the other's books. If anything, Packard management could be accused of not exercising due diligence prior to the merger. If this happened today, there would probably be shareholder lawsuits galore.
The real blow to Studebaker-Packard came when the insurance companies that Nance thought would extend the company credit to redo its lines for 1957 took one look at the company's rapidly deteriorating condition in 1955 and said "no." At that point, the company was finished. But 1956 was an election year, and incumbent President Eisenhower didn't want what would have been the biggest industrial bankruptcy in the nation's history to occur during an election year. (Hmmm...does this sound familiar?) Hence, he "encouraged" Curtiss-Wright to help out Studebaker-Packard. Curtiss-Wright coveted Studebaker-Packard's defense business, and it wanted to use the company's losses for tax write-off purposes.
Roy Hurley of Curtiss-Wright looked at the company with an accountant's eye, and realized that, with the collapse of Packard sales in 1956, and its lower volume, it made sense to rationalize production in South Bend. He also realized that it made sense from a financial standpoint to base future Packards on Studebaker bodies and mechanicals, as opposed to the other way around. Thus, Packard's Detroit plant was closed, its new V-8 engine plant sold, and those moves killed the true Packard car.
Packard never really recovered its footing in the postwar years, even though its production feats during World War II rivaled those of GM, Ford and Chrysler. Unfortunately, Packard's president during this time was George Christopher, brought in from GM to prepare for the mass production of the 120. He foolishly abandoned true luxury cars, and after the war, when Packard could have made a bid to return to its luxury roots, he emphasized dull medium-priced models, and approved really bad styling for the 1948-50 models.
He refused to restyle the "pregnant elephant" 1948-50 cars until it was too late. By then, Cadillac had come out with the 1-2-3 punch of the 1948 tailfinned cars, the 1949 V-8 engine, and the 1949 Coupe de Ville, and it had a lead in the luxury market that Packard (and Lincoln and Chrysler Imperial) could not overcome. The early postwar Packards were well made and well-engineered, but park a 1949 Packard next to a 1949 Cadillac - it's no contest as to which is better looking, or more "youthful" and exciting.
In many ways, Packard represented the "old wealth" that was swept away by the Great Depression and World War II. It was a conservative car with impeccable quality and low-key, but recognizable, styling. I recall reading that someone once said that Packards of the 1920s and 1930s were the best American cars ever made.
Cadillac appealed to the "new" rich (rising industrialists, Hollywood stars, athletes) who were brash, wanted to show off their success, and did not necessarily come from one of the old families or from society.
One thing I've wondered about many times is why, with good engineers and a reputation for engineering and innovation, Packard stuck with a flathead engine, with a relatively low compression, until 1955. I mention this more out of curiosity than criticism, because I have a soft spot for the domestic independents.
Well other companies stuck with flatheads even longer, like Chrysler and AMC.
But in all three of those cases, I think undercapitalization is the best answer. It costs a lot of money to develop an engine from scratch. And the '55 Packard V-8 was very problematic. Even Rolls Royce had tremendous problems with its first V-8s.
Lucky Chevy hit a home run however with the small block.
This is a small thing maybe, but I never understood why Packard stuck with vacuum windshield wipers right up to the end...particularly in their price class. Even Studebaker trucks had electric wipers starting in '55.
Bill P.
2024 Chevrolet Corvette Stingray 2LT; 2019 Chevrolet Equinox LT; 2015 Chevrolet Cruze LS
While what you said regarding Chrysler and AMC is correct, it's also true that these manufacturers, and Studebaker, featured OHV and flathead engines, rather than flatheads only. Chrysler introduced its 331 (same as Cadillac)180 hp (20 more than Cadillac) hemi V8 in 1950, for the 1951 model year. I think the Nash Ambassador's OHV I-6 dated back to the '40s, and maybe earlier.
The only other American company that I can think of that stayed with flatheads exclusively until the mid-'50s is Hudson.
Possibly it was also because of the excellent low-end torque Packard got out of their flatheads. Packard and Hudson made flatheads that generally performed as well as SOME of the early V8s. Hudson's flatheads were kicking butt on the race track long after they should have been able to do that.
Well, I think you're right; Packards and Hudsons managed to be competitive on performance, overall, through '54 with their old, massaged engines. The average owner of, say, a '51-'54 Packard was probably pleased with his car's performance, as were Hudson owners.
I think a large part of the success on the track of those "fabulous Hudson Hornets" was attributable to their chasses, and the "step-down design's" low center of gravity.
Even Chevrolet had problems with the early 265 V-8s. I heard they had oil burning problems. One solution given to dealers was to pour some Bon Ami down the carb to "scuff-up" the cylinders to prevent oil blow by.
The Chevy smallblock also ended up being overly heavy. Low reciprocating mass, yes, but the entire engine was still pretty chunky. The reason for this is that the original design was too fragile, so instead of just redesigning it correctly, they just sort of added bracing here and there, after the fact. Supposedly they tended to be weak in the bottom end...crankshaft area and such, even after the beefing up.
The latest issue (October '09) of Collectible Automobile has an article that speculates on what the 2010 Packards would be like if the company had survived. The article is entitled "Packard for 2010." I've wondered what the models of the domestic independent auto makers would be like today. Anyway, the article is an entertaining fantasy. For example, it speculates that the top models would feature a V12 engine.
Brooks Stevens had some interesting designs had Studebaker hung on another year or two. I think they would have translated nicely into Packard had it still been around. If you think D3 has union problems, its nothing compared to what Studebaker ran into over the years.
I don't see a V12 engine as making any sense in 2010 myself. I would see Packard in 2010 as more of a small volume manufacturer of conservative tastes, maybe making cars for exclusive livery.
I agree with your comment about the V12 engine, and was about to include words to that effect with my message, but then decided to not include my personal opinion. Even though this is a fantasy article, it's difficult to exclude real world considerations from your thoughts.
On your second point, since this is just a fantasy, I'd prefer to let my fantasy of the 2010 Packard remain similar to what it actually was; a brand that a not-so-small number of upper-medium and luxury car buyers would choose. Kind of like Lexus.
That might be a reasonable dream. Packard was always a very conservative company. Never took big chances but always refined what it already knew how to do. I only commented on the V12 because I was wondering how the magazine could be so out of touch with reality in 2010--but then, they were just "dreaming", so they have a right to spin that any way they want.
I look at Packard also as maybe occupying the same position in the US market that MB has - especially with the E-class sized cars and above. Usually conservative styling, lots of cachet.
True, but maybe without all of MBs over-engineering. Packards in their time were not technically complex vehicles. I suspect their vision was "to be ahead of one's time but not very far ahead, so as to suffer for it".
For most luxury car buyers, over engineering is a positive. For me it's a negative. I appreciate the high quality, luxury, style and driving dynamics associated with luxury models, but don't care for excessive features, some of which detract from, rather than enhance, the driving experience. The new German luxury brands have gone beyond my needs and desires in terms of features. What would get me to take out my wallet would be a decontented A-4, 3-Series or 5-Series, or C or E-Class. Keep the basic quality and goodness, but spare me such things as backup-up and lane change alerts, to name just two of many things I'd delete. I'm not holding my breath.
Comments
http://www.carnut.com/specs/gen/pack50.html
Seems to me a Patrician should be a 352.
There is a story behind the upright windshield. I heard Otis Romine, a Studebaker truck engineer who pitched in on the Avanti, say at a seminar about 15 years ago, that Studebaker's president, Sherwood Egbert, a 40-something 6'4" ex-Marine, kept knocking his head on the Avanti seating buck every time he came into the engineering studio and insisted on increased headroom...hence the upright windshield.
Bill P.
I had heard that Nance, in a fit, had stuff destroyed (he was, after all, President of Studebaker-Packard and was a Packard guy), but thousands of Packard documents, post-merger and pre-merger, including blueprints, made their way into the Studebaker National Museum archives.
http://www.studebakermuseum.org/archives.asp
Bill P.
I think the quick collapse of Studebaker rather proves the point. It was sicker than the company it tried to rescue.
Packard engineering was outstanding compared to Studebaker. it always enjoyed a good reputation in the auto industry.
Who else pioneered active suspension, electronic transmission control and lock up torque converters in 1956?
The Studebaker Lark could have been built in 1935 for as "advanced" as it was technically.
To be fair, one could say the same for the Ford Falcon and Mustang.
As one Packard man said about Studebaker: "They couldn't build a Packard, but we helped them build them some very good Studebakers".
There is no question that Packard had much more cash in bank at the time of the merger. Would they themselves have survived the serious production and sales decline issues of '55-56, or the change in the marketplace in '57-58 as cars in that market found less favor (like Edsel and Mercury sales then)? No one will know I guess. But Studebaker survived them and lasted a decade longer than Hudson (AMC was really mostly 'Nash' after the merger), Kaiser-Frazer, Willys automobiles, etc.
S-P losses during the merger years:
1955 $29.7 million (Source: Business Week, April 21, 1956)
1956 $43 million (Sources: too many to enumerate)
1957 $11 million (Sources: too many to enumerate--75% reduction of loss with reduced sales from '56--Packard gone)
1958 $13 million
1959 $28.5 million profit
Studebaker built automobiles until March 17, 1966--ten years after the last Packard was built. This is a 'quick demise'? And the Canada plant was making a small profit on their production when they shut down. Problem was, the other divisions were doing much better and the Board wasn't happy with a small profit.
In fact, Studebaker Corp. stayed in business, just didn't build cars. The Parts and Service Division remained in business in South Bend until 1972, and in fact had contracts with dealers around the country and in Canada to be 'authorized Studebaker parts and service dealers' until that time, if the dealer wished to do so (our small town Chrysler-Plymouth-AMC dealer picked up the official franchise in Jan. '69 after our longtime Stude dealer got out of the business). There are pictures I could post of the factory Studebaker Parts Depot in South Bend taken in 1971!
And if you saw the file cabinet upon file cabinet of Packard stuff in the archives at the Studebaker National Museum, including build sheets for '55 and '56 models, I think you wouldn't be able to make the blanket statement, "Studebaker destroyed all of Packard's records".
And come on, 180 hp 4-barrel with automatic, power steering and brakes, Twin Traction, 2-door hardtop '59 Lark could have been built in 1935? We all know what they say about opinions, everybody has one, but staying somewhat factual can help too!
Bill P.
Studebaker market share in 1963 was .9%...that's right, Point Nine of one percent.
The company was a walking corpse even in 1954 when the S-P merger occurred. They were losing money faster than Packard, and in the merger, Nance allowed Studebaker to control the board of the new company.
Nance even tried to sell S-P immediately to Ford, and considered liquidating the company in 1955.
Packard stockholders were the most enraged, as thousands of them wrote to Nance before the merger to warn him that this was the worst possible idea.
Turns out, Packard stockholders were more educated than most, and they were right. Studebaker was sicker than Packard, it turns out.
Packard should have just died a dignified death instead of allowing itself to be looted and trashed IMO.
Studebaker was barbaric. The way they got rid of many of the longterm Packard people was to give them offices and jobs in Siberia, with nothing to do. They just humiliated them enough so that they'd quit. One man I know who worked for Packard for 25 years got about a $46 a month pension from Studebaker.
My opinion was that Studebaker executives actually committed fraud in this deal. They doctored and hide the true financial status of their company--a company I might add that was threatened with bankruptcy even before the merger, as later investigation showed.
I think "The Fall of the Packard Motor Company" by James Ward pretty much spells out the whole ugly story.
Studebaker built about 80,000 1963-model Lark, Cruiser, Hawk, and Avanti cars. Trucks in total I'm not sure, but I know 5,800 pickups on top of that. Packard built 28,000 1956-model Packards and Clippers. What would their market share have been in '56? Even sicker than .9%. Packard built 200 cars in Feb. '56 (per Ward's book).
The Studebaker National Museum archives consists almost entirely of the records of the Studebaker Corporation as given to the City of South Bend after auto production ceased. They don't have tons of Packard records because 'some historian pulled them out of the dumpster' in Detroit. Sheesh.
You like Packard better than Studebaker, and me, the other way around. I don't think either of us will ever convince the other, otherwise! And that's OK of course. I just felt that initially, your posts (admittedly, your opinions) pretty much towed the typical Packard-buff line and in some places were factually questionable by means of omission of some significant other things going on at the same time, which deserved to be mentioned in context and are widely verifiable in Studebaker circles.
Bill P.
It's really not about "liking" one company or another. It's about trying to look at what really might have happened. I have no horse in this race, really.
From all I've read, I see a lot of treachery here, from Nance, from Studebaker, and from regulators turning a blind eye to various violations.
Perhaps it's just all the human failings that come about from desperation.
I guess my only prejudice might be that I would have rather seen Packard survive than Studebaker. I think it was a much more interesting car in 55-56, I mean technically. Studebaker products were antiquated, as befits a capital-starved company.
I don't mean to say that Studebaker's hiding of their true financial shape, by omission in '54, or Packard's not researching it further prior to the purchase, is not a bad thing. It is, of course. But I think the sales situation in the merger years.....the public's opinion of the company's products in the marketplace....was a result of something else entirely, by spring of 1956. I think Packard's quality image was largely gone by that time, due to word-of-mouth on the '55's and early '56's. Really, the bottom just fell out of their sales in '56...worse than Studebaker's. And the fact is, a '56 Packard Four-Hundred, to my eyes, in Scottish Heather and White, is the most desirable Packard I'd consider owning (despite my total lack of mechanical ability!).
Like today... I doubt news of GM's financial situation really keeps anybody from buying a GM product if they want one. But if they hear their neighbor's new GM blah-blah-blah is a quality disaster, that will keep them from buying. I think that has to be brought into the S-P mid-'50's discussion, at some point, as well as Studebaker's mis-stated break-even numbers two years before the combined company crumbled. One must also consider Studebaker's post-Packard sales successes (Scotsman, Lark, even Gran Turismo Hawk to a lesser extent) in context with the failed 'merger'.
I've enjoyed the debate...onto the next item!
Bill P.
Many well-trained men came out of Packard to find glory (and infamy) in careers with other automakers.
In the 20s and 30s, the three Ps (Packard, Peerless and Pierce Arrow) could proudly stand parked next to any Rolls Royce or fancy Italian coachwork.
Something else I always wondered...there was talk one time of a merger with Nash/Hudson, in the hopes of creating a "Big Four" and going head to head with GM, Ford, and Chrysler in all price categories. Now in something like that, I could definitely see Packard being the top run, along the lines of a Buick or Chrysler, although I really wouldn't see them as being able to pull off a Cadillac level of prestige. And I always looked at a Hudson as being a bit upscale. But which would have been the bottom feeder...Studebaker or Nash?
As for the merger into a "Big Four", once Mason of Nash-Kelvinator died, the new president Romney was not interested in a merger of the 4 companies.
This is also why a Nash Metropolitan looks like it has refrigerator doors :P
"The Packard-Clipper end of the business has been the heaviest loser. According to one report, Packard has already been offered to Ford Motor Co. and turned down. Packard-Clipper Div. just announced a $3 million promotion campaign, biggest in its history".
"One proposal that Wall Street hears is under study is to sell the Packard engine plant at Utica, Mich., to a truck manufacturer, move Packard assembly to a smaller plant, and put the huge Detroit plant up for sale. Headquarters would be moved to South Bend, Ind., Studebaker's home, and the Studebaker nucleus itself might be sold to some company that could use a tax loss."
I can't remember where...maybe it was the '56 Annual Report, maybe not...but I remember reading that sale of the big East Grand Boulevard Packard plant brought in only $750,000. By the '55 model year, production already had moved out of there and into a small former Chrysler plant on Conner Blvd.
Bill P.
"The Studebaker President was one of the most glorious cars of the Golden Age and set countless records on road and track. It was also beautifully styled, impeccably engineered, and a better road car than such highly respected "Classics" (as defined by the CCCA) as Packard, Cadillac, and Pierce Arrow--and I have this on the authority of people who have owned all four".
Bill P.
Nice car, though, very nice and a few models bring serious money today, but without V-12s and V-16s, it's really not in the same class as a Packard, Cadillac or Pierce. Hollywood stars and European heads of state and Saudi princes did not rush out to buy Studebakers but they did buy Packards.
They are more in the Buick class IMO, or perhaps LaSalle.
MrShiftright
Host
I think there was too much overlap between Hudson, Nash, and Studebaker to create a viable competitor against the Big Three. If Hudson, Nash, Packard and Studebaker had combined into one company, Packard could have gone against Cadillac, Lincoln, and Imperial by dropping the medium price models. It would have been more challenging to sort out how to position Hudson, Nash and Studebaker. Even though many of their models competed price-wise, they were very different cars, with different philosophies. They really didn't complement each other, which is important for a successful merger. That may be why the merger never happened.
If Willys had been added to the merger mix, that brand could have been the bottom feeder.
GM's stuff was so sexy, so modern---they were just whumping the competition and slapping Ford and Chrysler silly in terms of market share.
After the merger, Packard's controller visited South Bend and was horrified to discover that Studebaker's break-even point was well over 300,000 vehicles! The company had only hit that figure once before (1950). When he confronted Studebaker's top management with this information, they dismissed it, noting that the company had made money on lower volume in other years.
What Studebaker management missed is that, one, during the early 1950s, their labor costs had drifted far out of line with the Big 3; two, their factory was increasingly antiquated and less productive than competitors' facilities; and three, beginning with the Ford Blitz of 1953, discounts by ALL car companies were necessary to move the metal.
Studebaker had made money on lower volume during the postwar sellers' market, when demand outstripped supply, and it could charge more for its vehicles and maintain volume. Once the postwar sellers' market ended, factors one and two reared their ugly heads with a vengeance. Studebaker also didn't take into account that a fair percentage of its total profit was coming from defense work.
A Studebaker staffer "costed out" a 1953 Commander Starliner using GM's cost structure. He discovered that GM could have sold it for LESS than the cost of a Chevrolet. Studebaker had to sell it at Buick prices, and was still not making any money!
The entire merger had been conducted on a "friendly" basis. Neither side spent much time examining the other's books. If anything, Packard management could be accused of not exercising due diligence prior to the merger. If this happened today, there would probably be shareholder lawsuits galore.
The real blow to Studebaker-Packard came when the insurance companies that Nance thought would extend the company credit to redo its lines for 1957 took one look at the company's rapidly deteriorating condition in 1955 and said "no." At that point, the company was finished. But 1956 was an election year, and incumbent President Eisenhower didn't want what would have been the biggest industrial bankruptcy in the nation's history to occur during an election year. (Hmmm...does this sound familiar?) Hence, he "encouraged" Curtiss-Wright to help out Studebaker-Packard. Curtiss-Wright coveted Studebaker-Packard's defense business, and it wanted to use the company's losses for tax write-off purposes.
Roy Hurley of Curtiss-Wright looked at the company with an accountant's eye, and realized that, with the collapse of Packard sales in 1956, and its lower volume, it made sense to rationalize production in South Bend. He also realized that it made sense from a financial standpoint to base future Packards on Studebaker bodies and mechanicals, as opposed to the other way around. Thus, Packard's Detroit plant was closed, its new V-8 engine plant sold, and those moves killed the true Packard car.
Packard never really recovered its footing in the postwar years, even though its production feats during World War II rivaled those of GM, Ford and Chrysler. Unfortunately, Packard's president during this time was George Christopher, brought in from GM to prepare for the mass production of the 120. He foolishly abandoned true luxury cars, and after the war, when Packard could have made a bid to return to its luxury roots, he emphasized dull medium-priced models, and approved really bad styling for the 1948-50 models.
He refused to restyle the "pregnant elephant" 1948-50 cars until it was too late. By then, Cadillac had come out with the 1-2-3 punch of the 1948 tailfinned cars, the 1949 V-8 engine, and the 1949 Coupe de Ville, and it had a lead in the luxury market that Packard (and Lincoln and Chrysler Imperial) could not overcome. The early postwar Packards were well made and well-engineered, but park a 1949 Packard next to a 1949 Cadillac - it's no contest as to which is better looking, or more "youthful" and exciting.
In many ways, Packard represented the "old wealth" that was swept away by the Great Depression and World War II. It was a conservative car with impeccable quality and low-key, but recognizable, styling. I recall reading that someone once said that Packards of the 1920s and 1930s were the best American cars ever made.
Cadillac appealed to the "new" rich (rising industrialists, Hollywood stars, athletes) who were brash, wanted to show off their success, and did not necessarily come from one of the old families or from society.
Times changed, and Packard didn't - or coudn't.
One thing I've wondered about many times is why, with good engineers and a reputation for engineering and innovation, Packard stuck with a flathead engine, with a relatively low compression, until 1955. I mention this more out of curiosity than criticism, because I have a soft spot for the domestic independents.
But in all three of those cases, I think undercapitalization is the best answer. It costs a lot of money to develop an engine from scratch. And the '55 Packard V-8 was very problematic. Even Rolls Royce had tremendous problems with its first V-8s.
Lucky Chevy hit a home run however with the small block.
Bill P.
The only other American company that I can think of that stayed with flatheads exclusively until the mid-'50s is Hudson.
I think a large part of the success on the track of those "fabulous Hudson Hornets" was attributable to their chasses, and the "step-down design's" low center of gravity.
On your second point, since this is just a fantasy, I'd prefer to let my fantasy of the 2010 Packard remain similar to what it actually was; a brand that a not-so-small number of upper-medium and luxury car buyers would choose. Kind of like Lexus.
The embrace of V12s and the embrace of a specific radiator shell/grille theme is a nice coincidence, too.